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Having long been fascinated by Michael Frayn's work, I could not 
resist the editors' kind invitation to offer some impressions of his 
play, Copenhagen, from the perspective of a quantum physicist.  As 
well as the the original 1998 National Theatre production and the 
play's text, these are influenced by Frayn's intriguing metaphysical 
books Constructions (1974) and The Human Touch (2006), which explore 
more directly some of the questions that the play raises about human 
narratives, knowledge and motivations, and their possible connection 
to fundamental physics. 
 
The extent to which Copenhagen respects historical fact has been much 
discussed.  Not being competent to judge, I have to admit that my 
appreciation of the play relies on a less stringent test: that Frayn's 
characters, their reconstructed conversations and their conjectured 
motives should have some interesting correlations -- a quantum 
physicist would say, a significant inner product -- with historical 
and psychological reality.  By this criterion, I think the play 
succeeds superbly: Frayn gets the scientific technicalities right, 
captures brilliantly physicists' ways of thinking and conversational 
style, and gives us believable versions of Heisenberg and of Niels and 
Magrethe Bohr. 
 
Frayn tells his story as a series of ``drafts'', hypothetical and 
seemingly incompatible histories.  Within and around these drafts are 
many images and metaphors drawn from quantum physics -- in particular 
Bohr's principle of complementarity and Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle.  These are certainly enjoyably playful analogies, which 
hint at speculations of a deeper connection, and could even be read as 
insisting that science teaches us that elementary particles and human 
beings alike necessarily resist any more precise analysis. 
 
However, this last reading, I think, should itself be resisted. 
Postmodernists and historical relativists have indeed, of course, 
often called on quantum theory in their support. And indeed, to be 
fair, one of the deepest and most beautiful ways of formulating 
quantum theory describes the evolution of states over time as the 
collective result of a sum over alternative histories. Indeed, too, 
defining and justifying the concept of an unambiguous past remains a 
deep unsolved problem in modern quantum cosmology.  On the other hand, 
physicists tend to wonder how it can possibly be consistent to rely on 
-- and, most of us would say, wildly extrapolate -- features of one 
scientific theory in order to argue for a radically anti-scientific 
world view. 
 
In any case, Frayn goes deeper.  One of the most intriguing parts of 
the play, for me, was Magrethe's argument that the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum theory, while purporting to subsume 
complementarity and uncertainty within a complete and consistent 
metaphysical account of science, should be understood as something 
more in the nature of a political treaty than a hard-won intellectual 
revelation arrived at purely by logical analysis of experimental data. 
 
Magrethe's target is not quantum theory itself, but the philosophical 
clothing in which many of its founders dressed it. They were led 
empirically by a series of quite unexpected experimental results, and 
created a quite extraordinarily successful theory -- one that predicts 
mathematically the outcomes of experiments and observations covering a 
vast range of physical phenomena, and to very high precision. And yet, 
uncomfortable though it is for many physicists to accept, the 
theoretical physics community is of course not exempt from the natural 
human tendencies towards herding and constructing social hierarchies, 
which tend to develop consensus views by extra-scientific means. 
 
It is the tension between these two dynamics that makes the 
intellectual history of quantum theory so sociologically fascinating. 
It explains how it can nowadays be respectable for a physicist to say 
that she does not really know what precisely Bohr and his followers 
meant by the Copenhagen interpretation or the principle of 
complementarity, and to wonder how these cloudy and at best 
provisional ideas so dominated physicists' understanding of quantum 
theory for so long -- a view which was close to heresy between around 
1930 and 1980. The fact is, if one is thoughtful and open-minded, when 
one tries to extract an account of the ultimate natures of reality or 
scientific knowledge from quantum theory, one finds oneself once again 
surrounded by drafts.  There is ample motivation to tweak an equation 
here, or vary an axiom there, or take a new physical perspective -- 
changes whose empirical consequences are imperceptible, but which 
produce radically different resulting stories about reality and our 
experience.  For now -- until we find better ideas or a better theory 
-- scientists and artists alike can indulge their tastes, picking and 
choosing from a startlingly wide range of metaphysical views that seem 
consistent with quantum theory.  One of the beauties of the play, for 
me, is its openness to this ambiguity, subtly querying its own central 
metaphors at the same time as using them to query other claims to 
truth. 
 
Could there yet turn out to be some firm scientific basis to these 
metaphors, though? Could we, for example, ultimately find a deep 
connection between quantum theory and human consciousness? This 
question intrigues many physicists. To my mind, two of the most 
fascinating problems we face in understanding nature are the problem 
of finding a mathematical description of reality consistent with 
quantum theory, and of finding a fundamental physical theory of 
consciousness.  Perhaps the questions are ill-posed, but one can at 
least imagine possible ways in which they could have elegant 
scientific solutions, and -- albeit yet more vaguely, speculatively 
and uncompellingly -- possible forms of mathematical law connecting 
the two.  So I don't think the question is meaningless or will 
necessarily ultimately prove fruitless. However, we don't seem to have 
even the beginnings of a physical theory of consciousness: if there 
actually is such a thing, we may be further from uncovering it than 
the ancient Greeks were from modern physics. All in all, I'm not too 
optimistic that we will make any scientific discoveries relating 
consciousness and quantum theory any time soon. 
 
I thought I would try to conclude on a less analytic and more playful 
note, by seeing if I could suggest a new parallel between physics and 
human behaviour that might appeal to Frayn's readers. In Copenhagen, 
human beings, under Frayn's microscope, are seen as something more 
like miniature communities, with their own internal politics, power 
struggles, and internal compromises -- an analogy made more explicit 
in "The Human Touch" and his later play, "Democracy". To a physicist, 
this brings to mind the self-similar scaling laws governing many 
statistical systems near phase transitions and fractals, whose 
properties, viewed at any two fixed length scales, are intimately 
mathematically related --- but not generally identical.  For example, 
the strength of the interaction between neighbouring elements in a 
statistical system may depend on the ratio of the scales. One could 
try to improve Frayn's model by thinking of ourselves as some sort of 
mathematically rescaled community.  But then which features should be 
rescaled? Could this model of a self containing Whitmanesque 
multitudes (which contain their own multitudes, and so on) perhaps 
even guide us to interestingly different ways of weighting the inputs 
of different parts of our selves when arriving at life decisions?  For 
example, there are solid arguments in favour of giving regions (or 
other subcomponents) in a nation a representation in the government 
proportional to the square root of their population [1].  Political 
complexities may generally prevent this mathematical ideal being 
realised in the government of nations, but there is nothing to stop  
us (if we really think we can make sense of the idea) from implementing 
this or other interesting and novel strategies when governing our own 
behaviour.  In fact, anthropologists and social scientists have already given much thought [2] 
to the idea of a parallel between mathematical self-similarity and 
human communities.  So maybe there is limited new mileage in these 
admittedly undeveloped thoughts.  Still, I thought I would offer them, 
in a spirit of cross-disciplinary experiment, in case some readers 
might possibly find some creative uses for them. 
 
[1] See for example L.S.Penrose, The elementary statistics of majority 
voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109, pp 53-57.   
[2] E.g. On The Order of Chaos: Social Anthropology and the Science of 
Chaos, M.S. Mosko and F.H. Damon (eds.), (Berghahn Books, 2005). 
